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PEACE OPERATIONS IN FAILED STATES: WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE MODEL TO EMPLOY?

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ABSTRACT

In the Post-Cold War era, the US military has frequently conducted peace operations. Such operations have practically become the norm, particularly in failed states. Most failed states are typically unable to provide basic social, economic, legal, and political services and safeguards to their citizens. Consequently, when the US military enters a failed state as a peace operations force, the conditions supporting peace more often than not are fragile or even non-existent. This study examines an appropriate peace operations model for a failed state where the likelihood for continued conflict and violence persist. This paper describes failed states, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace maintenance and peace building. The examples of two historical states (Somalia and East Timor) indicate the utility and feasibility of this model. This study examines the reasons for military intervention and also why it's essential for the US military to have the right force employed. This study examines why the appropriate model to employ in a failed state should be peace enforcement, peace maintenance and peace building.

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> Today, the United strives to keep its military forces combat ready while at the time, engaging in missions that do not routinely involve combat. When it becomes necessary to send out troops into an unpredictable and potentially hostile environment, we must ensure they are trained and ready for all possible contingencies no matter how unlikely these contingencies may seem at the outset.
>
> —Retired Army General Henry H. Shelton

The Post-Cold War era has witnessed a vast increase in the frequency of peace operations. Between 1988 and mid-2000 there were forty peace keeping missions.[1] The majority of these operations have been conducted in nation-states experiencing internal conflict, collapsed governments, fragile economies, and lawlessness. *Failed state* is the name given to these states, because they are unable to provide law and order, economic stability, and essential social services to their people. Failed states are "the focus of the Post-Cold war peace operations."[2]

In the past quarter-century, intervention from the United Nations (U.N.) on behalf of the international community has become the accepted international response to crises resulting from failed states. Historically, when responding to crises in failed states, the international community has used peace operations, carried out by peacekeeping forces, as the tool to maintain regional stability and security.

This study examines reasons for military intervention in failed states, and shows why it's essential for the military to employ the right forces to conduct peace operations. This study will suggest an appropriate peace operations model to employ in a failed state. It will describe factors in failed states that make peacekeeping operations and forces ineffective and mandate peace enforcement operations and forces for success. It will recommend peace operations include peace-building activities and peace-maintenance operations. The suggested model's utility will be then applied to two historical failed states (Somalia and East Timor). This study argues that the appropriate intervention to employ in a failed state is a peace operations model composed of peace enforcement, peace maintenance, and peace building operations.

FAILED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

The Hart-Rodman Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, in their identification of specific challenges the U.S. must be able to meet in the next 25 years, cited

failed states and weak states as the future's greatest threats.[3] Information supporting this contention comes from George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who, in February 2001, stressed that "a major concern for U.S. security to address will be the growing potential for state fragmentation and failure."[4]

The U.S. and the international community have been placed in the position where they must intervene in failed states rather than ignore them: Failed states threaten regional security and peace. Nations now view failed states as being "strategically significant today and see them lying at the heart of many contemporary security challenges."[5] Michael Dziedzic points out in his article "Troubled States: How Troubling, How Manageable," that as these failed states continue to disintegrate, they will generate humanitarian catastrophes.[6] He further suggests that when "an oppressed domestic group becomes the target of systematic violence, this will inevitably spawn a mass migration in search of a safe haven, either internally"[7] or externally into neighboring countries. He further points out that after governments have collapsed in these states, there will be no law and order. Dziedzic's major concern is that these states will end up becoming "an incubator for transnational threats for organized crime, terrorism, arms trafficking, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction."[8]

The cost of imposing law and order in failed states is high, the effort is dangerous, and success is not easy to achieve. But given that the cost to the U.S. of the Balkans was $15 billion and the cost of Afghanistan so far is $40 billion, it is still "cheaper to fix a failed state than fight a war."[9]

FAILED STATES

When a state can no longer provide good governance, enforce the law and protect its citizens from crime and violence, when it can no longer produce economic prosperity, educate and provide its citizens with health care, that state has failed. If the state cannot maintain its place as a member of the international community, then that state will descend "into violence, political instability, random warfare, massive human rights abuses, poverty, humanitarian disaster, and refugee crisis."[10] Lack of governance and economic instability in a failed state leads to widespread crime, particularly extortion and black marketing.[11] This lawlessness, in turn, makes it possible for terrorists to take sanctuary in these states. The international community is rightly concerned that, given the opportunity, transnational criminal networks will begin to operate and become so entrenched they will be hard to expel.[12] The international

community is also rightly concerned that their political, social, and economic stability will be disrupted if neighbors in the region become failed states.[13]

In failed states, interventions by international forces may be easily viewed by the native population as invasive entry by intruders. In a failed state, the international military forces are open to encounter situations in which one native group or another will come to feel that the international force is blocking its path to power or its opportunity to destroy the enemy.[14] That leads to attacks on humanitarian workers and the peace-keeping forces. Indigenous-force actions can range from sniping to hostage-taking , from efforts to compromise individual soldiers to intimidating military units by bomb threats, and even attacks on peace keepers' sleeping quarters or whole installations.[15]

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

The UN implements the will of the international community and is charged with the responsibility to maintain peace and security. The U.N. derives its authority to engage in the settlement of international disputes from the U.N. Charter.

CONSENT

According to Chapter VI of the Charter, the U.N. is charged to maintain global peace and security by--

> ...the settlement of disputes by a variety of peaceful measures, including negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and judicial settlement (Article 33). The Security Council is authorized to investigate any dispute, or any situation, which will lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. (34). The Security Council is authorized at any stage of a dispute to recommend appropriate procedures. (Article 36) The Security Council is authorized to call on the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means or to make recommendations (Article 37). If the Security Council deems the continuance of the of the dispute is likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security, they should decide to take action under Article 36.[16]

Since 1956, the U.N. has followed the six principles for peacekeeping developed during the cold war by Sir Brian Urquhart, who later became the U.N. Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs. The international community, which has long accepted these principles as guidelines for successful peacekeeping operations, supports the U.N.'s tradition of undertaking peacekeeping operations only with--

- consent of all factions to the peacekeeping operations, to include mandates, force composition, and commanding officers.

- clear and feasible mandates

- force used only as a last resort in self-defense to include use against factions preventing peacekeepers from conducting duties

- availability of trained troops from countries willing to participate and accept risks

- availability of financial and logistical support; continued support by Security Council (mandating authority) [17]

CONSENT WITHOUT A FIRM COMMITMENT

After the end of the Cold War Boutros Boutros-Ghali began urging the U.N. to intervene in failed states based on the "collapse of domestic governing authority, displaced populations or gross violations of human rights, or when developments within the failed states posed a threat to international peace and stability."[18] The criteria established by Boutros Boutros-Ghali helped the international community see that it could be possible to intervene in a state's conflict where the state's consent was lacking a firm commitment. The international community, as it became aware of the disruptive influence of a failed state, was no longer willing to let a failed state's sovereignty be a reason for non-intervention. Now, the international community knows that when intervening in failed states they must be prepared for the possibility that consent for their intervention may be changed (by one or both of the disputing parties) after the intervention force arrives.

Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter spells out what actions the U.N. Security Council can take when there are threats to peace, violations of peace agreements, and acts of aggression. It allows the UN Security Council to determine which measures not involving the use of armed force may be employed to bring about compliance with its direction. It also allows the Security Council to call on the U. N. member nations to apply those measures. Measures that can be applied in these circumstances include—

- complete or partial interruption of economic relations

- complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication

- the severance of diplomatic relations (Article 41)

But Chapter VII goes on to say *if the Security Council decides that the measures provided in Article 41 will be inadequate, or if they have proved to be inadequate, the Security Council may*

take action by air, sea, or land forces it deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. The actions may include demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of U.N. member nations (Article 42).[19]

RCENT INTERVENTIONS

In the 1990s most crises calling for an international community intervention have occurred in failed states. Traditionally, the international response has been to intervene by mounting a peacekeeping operation. These operations more truly call for *peace enforcement* operations than *peacekeeping* operations. As Michael Dziedzic points out in his article "Trouble States: How Troubling, How Manageable," the Security Council willingly approves of peace enforcement.[20]

PEACE OPERATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

The peace operations model in the 21st century that is most appropriate for use in failed states is a model that includes peace enforcement, peace maintenance, and peace building operations and forces as well as peacekeeping operations and forces. Peace enforcement operations will restore peace and provide security to protect citizens and NGOs. Peace maintenance operations will help establish political control and bring in citizens to help build a new system of good governance. Peace building operations will help citizens rebuild their economic, health, and education systems. Including these specific operations can help sustain the peace in failed states and allow local authorities the chance to build and buttress their infrastructure.

PEACEKEEPING

Traditionally, the initial response under the umbrella of peace operations is peacekeeping. "Peacekeeping is an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the U.N. to help maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict."[21]

The U.N. Security Council undertakes peacekeeping under Chapter VI to maintain peace and security. When the Security Council decides to take on a peacekeeping operation, that operation is carried out as a form of peace support. The operation includes a spectrum of actions ranging from UN observation missions to full-fledged peacekeeping missions.

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Observation missions use small groups of military personnel to monitor the emplacement of existing political settlement between adversarial or bellicose parties. Observation forces are lightly-armed, if at all; they are—

- present only with the consent of the parties

- have no enforcement powers

- their role is entirely passive

- involve more substantial military units that allow these for us stand between the belligerent parties who already reached a political settlement.

The role of the force is defensive and passive in order to play, for example, an interpositional role between parties.[22]

A traditional peacekeeping operation is not the right model to employ in a failed state. An intervening force playing a defensive, passive role will not be able to correct the causes of a state's collapse. That requires more authority and control than a peace keeping operation can provide.

Do we want to send unprepared military into an environment where the condition for peace is fragile? The answer is a resounding "no," because such intervention would be a prescription for mission failure and unnecessary casualties. Peacekeeping operations are not a suitable model to employ in failed states.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Intervention in a failed state is best carried out as a peace enforcement operation. An internal consensus for peace normally does not exist in a failed state. The conditions for peace, which are very fragile or even nonexistent, may erupt into armed conflict without warning. The situation facing intervening forces in a failed state is war-like. Peacekeeping forces are not prepared nor equipped to succeed in the war-like situation of a failing state. Traditional peace operation forces are too lightly armed for such circumstances. The intervening force in a peace enforcement operation is normally heavily armed. Its mission is to restore peace and establish security so NGO workers can feed the people and provide safe shelter for a displaced population. As part of its security duties the intervening force needs to be able to set up and carry out a program to collect small arms from adversarial parties. On occasion the intervening force may be asked to establish a program to train the state's new military force. Only a heavily

armed peace enforcement force is appropriate to engage in the duties of establishing security and restoring peace in the war-like environment of a failed state.

Intervening forces working in a failed state can be expected to confront problems of crime, poverty, disease, illiteracy, and a lack of economic prosperity and good governance. But operational planners attempting to help failing states may or may not be able to foresee the conditions where that state cannot or will not consent to U.N. intervention because of internal political chaos. Yet the international community is too aware of the risks inherent in a collapsed state to allow a failed state's sovereignty to result in non-intervention.

When planning for intervention It makes sense to plan for the worst scenario—no consent or consent without commitment caused by political chaos in the failed state. Intervening in those circumstances means having the right forces trained, equipped, and ready to deploy, able to deliver whatever the situation calls for.

Since US participation involvement in U.N. intervention in failed states has become virtually routine, selecting the right peace operations model becomes critical for the U.S. military as well as for U.N. operational planners. Planning the employment of the right force for peace operations is essential--it makes a big difference in terms of how an organization will train and equip for a deployment. According to Blankmeyer in "Sustaining Combat Readiness During Peace Operations," "when the 1st Armored Division (1AD) deployed to Bosnia, Brigadier Stanley Cherrie noted that division [training for deployment] was as intense as any training that he had participated in during his 31 years of service. One rationale for the intensity of preparation for this deployment was that it was a 'peace enforcement' operation, one where the combat readiness of 1AD could be challenged at any time. The mission rehearsal training conducted at the Combat Maneuver Training Center was the best possible preparation for peace enforcement operations. The[se] skills are a key ingredient to successfully transitioning into peace operations. As noted by Major General Montgomery, Commander of the UNOSOM II in Somalia, 'A well-trained and disciplined military is the best foundation upon which to build a peacekeeping force.' [23]

Commanders of peace operations forces must arrive in country with their forces prepared to defend their units and enforce the peace under war-like conditions. [24] Attempting to transition from peacekeeping operations to peace enforcement operations in a hostile environment is not a desirable option for any military force.

PEACE MAINTENANCE

In his article "Responding to Failed States: Need for a Stratgey", Robin Dorff suggests that "dealing with failed states must include a prescription for curing"[25] what caused the state to collapse. In failed states, the most glaring problems, after lawlessness and small arms proliferation, are lack of good governance and economic prosperity and inadequate health care to combat infectious diseases. Redressing such problems in failed states goes beyond what can be effectively provided by peace enforcement operations. For intervention in these arenas the use of other instruments of power will be essential. When a failed state has been made secure and law and order re-established, the political instrument of power must be applied to establish good governance.

One of the great benefits in peace maintenance operations is the planned integration of the native population of the state into the process. Peace-maintenance focuses on getting the people involved. Peace maintenance seeks community participation in establishing good governance and in working toward the reconciliation and empowerment of the people.

The success of peace operations according to Boutros Boutros-Ghali depends on "comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of well-being among people."[26] The author proposes that peace-maintenance operations, in which intervention as a political instrument of power would be undertaken, be added under the umbrella of peace operations. The author sees peace maintenance intervention as an essential element of peace operations in a failed state. Temporary external help is critical to the process of reestablishing good internal governance in failed states.

The concept of peace maintenance originated with Jarat Chopra's book, *Peace Maintenance*. Chopra sees peace maintenance operations linking the strategic and the operational levels of command and control—the actions constitute the means by which the international community, represented by the peace maintenance personnel and force, can exercise its external "political authority within a failed state." [27] Peace-maintenance operations would incorporate diplomatic, military, and humanitarian activities [and the requisite practitioners] within an overall political strategy."[28]

Under the peace-maintenance model in a failed state, "the U.N. assumes exclusive responsibility for the collapsed state and serves as its governor-in-trust."[29] The U. N. can exercise varying degrees of authority in the state depending on the magnitude of the failure of the state. The U.N. can provide governorship, direct control, partnership or assistance in the

failed state. When serving in a governorship role, the U.N. becomes responsible for carrying out the affairs of the state. When providing direct control, the U.N. controls the instruments of the state or of the administering authority. If the local authority commits an infraction, the U.N. uses its overriding authority to take corrective action. When in a partnership role, the U.N. works as partner to the local authority, but one having a veto power and final say in decision-making. When providing assistance, the U.N. acts as an independent advisor, pointing out actions needed or flaws in the local system and suggesting corrections.[30]

According to Jarat Chopra, a peace-maintenance operation provides the failed state a political control mechanism and builds the state's administrative network—thereby helping the failed state establish the beginning of good governance. Peace maintenance operations can continue until the state becomes a viable, self-sustaining government, capable of providing law and order and protecting its citizens.

Under a model including peace-maintenance operations, the U.N. In a governorship role would carry out "the administration of necessary and basic state services, revivification of civil society and its institution; repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; the introduction of confidence building measures that stimulate rapprochement and encourage dialogue between belligerents; the initiation of transitional processes, such as the organization and preparation of elections; the consolidation of internal and external security by training and restructuring a local police force; the drawing up of an electoral list; the administration and monitoring of the electoral process, and ensuring all faction that want to participate are represented."[31] Two other tasks for the U.N. to work would be "the establishment of civilian control over the police force and local military and the establishment of provincial courts. The U.N. would also "facilitate national reconciliation, establish truth commissions, empower civil society, and engage in post-conflict institutional training and reform."[32]

The U.N. should identify what peace–maintenance tasks should be in the immediate-term, medium-term or long term. The purpose of tasks in the immediate-term stage is "preventive-to lower the level of intensity of the conflict and guarantee sufficiently the cessation of hostilities, so that negotiations can take place between the emerging authorities and the peace-maintenance authority. The purpose of tasks at the medium-term is once there is a period of sustained calm, then facilitate a smooth transition from international to local control of political authority. The emphasis at the long-term stage should be on a strategy that ensures the political and economic stability needed to avoid a descent back into violence."[33]

PEACE BUILDING

Peace operations need to include actions that will help rebuild a failed state's economic and social services institutions. Following the return to law and order and the beginnings of good governance, the next step in resuscitating a state is to address its problems of poverty, illiteracy, lack of economic prosperity and inadequate health care. Peace building operations are designed to help rebuild a failed state's economic, health, and educations systems. Joint Publication 1-02 defines peace building as "post conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild the governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict"[34] or a regression to failure.

As Boutros Broutros-Ghali points out, "only sustained, cooperative work [with assistance from other countries] to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation."[35] Peace building operations help create a sustainable peace in a failed state by developing agriculture, improving transportation, providing health and education, and establishing a system to promote economic prosperity. Peace building operations are the tool to help rebuild the economic, health, and education systems in a failed state.

The U.N. intervention forces and teams can begin peace building activities during the U.N.'s period of governorship. The operations would include building the "basic infrastructure— roads, bridges, health and education services, water and sanitation systems, irrigation systems, commercial outlets and telecommunication systems."[36] The U.N. advisors, NGO workers and others would look to the international community for economic aid. Efforts would be taken to coordinate economic packages and arrange for technical assistance. The goal would be to promote economic progress, revitalize social services, and implement environmental protection plans.

HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

History provides us with lessons that can help us prepare for and reckon with the future. Somalia and East Timor are failed states. Their governments are unable to govern, to enforce the laws, to protect their citizens, to produce economic prosperity, or to provide education and health care. These states failed when conditions deteriorated to such a grave state that they gave rise to humanitarian and refugee crises. The decision of the international community, in each case, was to intervene by conducting peace operations.

SOMALIA

Somalia is a good example of a state that is still functioning as a failed state in 2002, despite past peace operations intervention from the international community. After 20 years under the military dictatorship of General Siad-Barre, the last two of which were in the midst of civil war, Somalia failed as a state. United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I), began with the initial peace operations carried out from 15 August to 9 December 1992. In 1998, three years after the last U.N. troops had left Somalia, warlords were still fighting and there was still no central government.[37] Hundreds of thousands Somalis were still refugees in neighboring countries. The economy was still underdeveloped. The government was unable to provide adequate health care and education.[38] U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan recently said that Somalia remains one of the most dangerous environments in which the U.N. operates.[39]

During Barre's regime (1969-1990) his main goal was to eradicate clanism by stressing nationalism. While the goal could be considered desirable, the method employed was not. Those clan-groups opposing Barre were sent to prison, exiled, or murdered. The clan-based groups eventually mounted an insurgency movement against Barre's governance. As Barre began targeting innocent civilians, the clan-based insurgents gained support among the population. The insurgency resistance movement ultimately led to a civil war erupting in1988. The Somalian army fought against the clan-based insurgents. In 1990 clan-based insurgents successfully overthrew General Siad-Barre's government and gained control of the country.[40]

In time the clan-based insurgents turned against each other. As a result, two major factions formed. One faction was under the leadership of General Mohamed Farah Aideed and the other was under the leadership of businessman Ali Mahdi Hohamed. Both factions wanted control of the city of Mogadishu. The northern part of the city belonged to Ali, and Aideed controlled the southern area. As the fighting between the two factions persisted, it destroyed the city infrastructure and the public sector, and it produced civilian casualties.[41]

After the overthrow of Barre's government, there was no political authority to provide good governance. The struggle for power between Aideed and Ali prevented people from establishing a process to select a political figure. As a lawless society, the door opened for criminal activity to dominate the country. The availability of small arms proliferated and heavily armed youth gangs roamed the city. These gangs rode around in trucks mounted with machine guns. The heavily armed gangs terrorized and killed people.[42] Without a police force to maintain the law and order of Somalia became an unsafe and crime ridden country.

The economy in Somalia was a shambles. As result of drought, civil war and criminal activity, Somalia became incapable of producing food and feeding its people. This eventually

created a famine throughout the country, which in turn, created a humanitarian disaster and refugee crisis. The international community became seriously concerned about the massive loss of life and the refugee flow into neighboring countries. Somalia's condition was starting to have an impact on regional peace and stability. According to the U.N., the conditions continued to deteriorate until --

> [b]y 1992, almost 4.5 million people, more than half the total number in the country, were threatened with starvation, severe malnutrition and related diseases. The magnitude of suffering was immense. Overall, an estimated 300,000 people, including many children, died. Some 2 million people, violently displaced from their home areas, fled either to neighboring countries or elsewhere within Somalia. All institutions of governance and at least 60 per cent of the country's basic infrastructure disintegrated.[43]

Alleviating the starvation in the country was a major mission for the international aid workers. The U.N. and NGO workers in country attempted to operate their food distribution facilities, but operating in the unsafe, dangerous environment without security became impossible. The U.N. eventually moved its function to Nairobi, Kenya, and started flying in food to airports in Somalia for distribution. The NGO workers decided to stay in Somalia. Neither was successful in their efforts to curb starvation because looting, stealing and extortion from the gangs and clan warlords constantly interrupted their food distribution.[44]

The U.N. thought that the civil war had caused the interruption of food distribution. They started to focus on obtaining a cease-fire agreement between Aideed and Ali in order to stop the violence and ultimately establish a more secure environment for food distribution. The U.N. sent in James Jonah, Under Secretary-General, to meet with Aideed and Ali. James Jonah initially encountered some trouble with Aideed agreeing to a cease-fire, because Aideed considered the cease-fire a hindrance to his plan for ruling Somalia in the future. Despite his reservations, Aideed reluctantly accepted the U.N. cease-fire agreement with Ali in February 1992.

Two months later, the U.N. Security Council passed U.N.S.C.Resolution 751 to establish UNOSOM I. Resolution 751 called for providing observers to monitor the cease-fire and if necessary, it also authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force. With the observers in place to monitor, the U.N. was hopeful that a cease-fire would stop the looting. Unfortunately, the ceasefire did very little to prevent looting, causing the relief workers throughout the country to be unable to function.[45] The U.N. eventually decided to deploy a peacekeeping force as the answer to safeguarding the relief workers from looting and banditry.

The U.N. sent in a lightly armed force of 500 Pakistani peacekeepers. The peacekeeping force was given the mission of securing the port, safeguarding food shipments, and escorting

food convoys to the distribution stations. They were prohibited from returning fire except in self-defense. Even with a peacekeeping force in place, the armed gangs were still stealing the food. Unable to stop the banditry and looting, the peacekeepers were ineffective in their ability to protect the relief workers.[46] As result, the famine and people dying at record numbers continued. UNOSOM I was deemed an unsuccessful mission because without food and medical supplies,. Somalia remained a humanitarian and refugee catastrophe.

The chances of UNOSOM I's peace keeping force accomplishing its humanitarian mission with any degree of success were slim from the beginning for several reasons. First, given that the U.N. thought that the civil war was what was making the country dangerous and unsafe for the relief workers to function, the U.N.'s obtaining a cease-fire agreement to terminate the fighting between Aideed and Ali was a right decision. But the U.N. assumed that once the cease-fire was in effect, it would make traveling around the country less dangerous for the relief workers. It did not. The relief workers still experienced banditry and looting despite the cease-fire, and banditry and looting continued even with peacekeepers in place. The U.N. did not initially understand that a country lacking a political authority to administer good governance would eventually become a lawless society. Only when the food was still not reaching those in need did the U.N. begin to understand that the hijacking of vehicles and the looting of convoys and warehouses stemmed from the absence of a government capable of maintaining law and order.[47]

Second, the U.N. unknowingly sent a lightly armed peacekeeping force to accomplish what for them would be a virtually impossible mission. The peacekeepers were not equipped to fight gangsters. As a result, the peacekeepers were unable to accomplish their mission. The U.N. had underestimated the capabilities of the criminal element. The gangsters were heavily armed; they controlled their environment, and they profited from black marketing stolen food. The food was a matter of survival for gangsters, and they were not going to allow outsides to stop them. The gangsters outgunned and out manned the peacekeepers, and they were ready to fight. When the food distribution came to a halt, the U.N. realized that they needed to send in a bigger force.

Finally, Somalia's consent for sending in a peacekeeping force was shaky from the start. The U.N. should have conducted a security threat assessment to determine what effect a shaky consent would have on a peacekeeping operation. Aideed reluctantly agreed to a cease-fire agreement because of his selfish drive to eventually rule Somalia. Although the U.N. was successful in obtaining consent from Aideed and Ali to send in a peacekeeping force, it was fragile at best because once again, Aideed half-heartedly agreed. The U.N. probably assumed

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that Aideed, whether fully committed or not, would still support a peacekeeping operation. Several months after the operation started, Aideed felt that the peacekeepers were blocking his efforts to run the country. He gradually began withdrawing his support; eventually, he wanted them to leave. When he became unsuccessful in forcing peacekeepers out of Somalia, Aideed began to undermine the operation by firing at the peacekeepers and the ships carrying the food. Without the support of both parties, peacekeeping was impossible to achieve. The environment had turned hostile.

With the conditions in Somalia as they were, conducting a peace enforcement operation would have been better choice. Unfortunately, the Pakistani troops were not operationally able to take on this mission. Had the U.N. conducted an assessment it would have been better able to read Aideed. The U.N. would also have been prepared to handle the possibility of Aideed changing his mind—and perhaps considered sending in a peace enforcement force. The U.N. finally concluded that future peace operations in Somalia should be undertaken by a combat-ready peace enforcement force instead of a lightly-armed peacekeeping force.

During UNOSOM I Mohamed Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat who was representing the U.N. in Somalia, presented his Hundred-Day Plan for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia at a donor conference in Geneva. The plan's key objectives were 'to prevent further refugee outflows and the promotion of returnee programmes and to provide institution-building and rehabilitation of civil society'.[48] This plan was a beginning effort for the international community to establish strategy for good governance and rebuilding Somalia. According to John Hirch and Robert Oakley in their book, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, there were two drawbacks to the plan. They suggest that there was 'little Somali involvement, though it was envisaged, and it could be achieved only in a much improved security environment, at some time in the future'[49] The lack of security hampered the implementation of Sahnoun's plan. However, had the Security Council applied a peace operations model that included peace enforcement, peace maintenance, and peace building, that model would have supported Sahnoun's plan by addressing the core problems of Somalia's ungovernability, lawlessness, and economic instability. Sending in a peace enforcement force would have eventually established a secured environment. A secured environment would have made it easy to implement peace maintenance. This in turn would have initiated the process for developing good governance, and it would have included the Somalian people in the process of determining their future political direction. Then peace building operations would have started developing the country's economic, health, and education systems. Unfortunately, UNOSOM I's operational model was limited to peacekeeping and providing humanitarian aid. Furthermore,

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the U.N. mistakenly focused only on the immediate problem of starvation, without regard for the political and structural problems causing it.

The U.N. was not prepared to handle the unexpected. The U.N. attempted to use a traditional peacekeeping to carry out what was truly a peace enforcement mission. As a result, gangsters and Aideed were able to halt the humanitarian mission. The U.N. did not understand that Somalia's ungovernability would impact so adversely on the peacekeeping operations that it would keep the peacekeeping force from their accomplishing the mission.

Once the U.N. decides to again intervene in Somalia, each aspect of the peace operations will need a strong commitment from the U.S. and the international community. To rebuild the nation, the international community must be willing to commit its peace forces to stay engaged until Somalia is able to provide good governance and law and order and capable of sustaining itself economically. The U.N. commitment must include providing resources and staying involved even under adversity. Without a firm commitment and support from the U.S and the international community, it will be difficult to be successful. The U.N. force should plan to include regional neighbors to assist in their meetings with the warlords. They should build on what Kenyan President Moi began in 2001, when he began efforts to bring Somalian factions and Somalia's neighbors together to attempt a Somalian national reconciliation."[50]

Somalia will not attract investors and donors as long as the government infrastructure is failing and unable to produce economic prosperity. Yes, Somalia will continue to receive relief money for food-aid. The relief money received from the USAID will not solve the problems plaguing Somalia. Ignoring the issue of good governance and lack of economic prosperity is only going to attract terrorist groups and organized crime. In Somalia today, "Al-Ittihad al-Islami, a terrorist group, is working toward "creating a radical Islamist state in Somalia. They have filled the vacuum in some parts of Somalia by opening their own schools and providing services normally associated with government."[51] Somalia in the future could very easily become a state sponsor of terrorist activity---and a very grave threat to regional security.

If the U.S. and the international community do not want Somalia to become a terrorist state, then they must treat Somalia as a failed state and help it rebuild. The U.N. must intervene with peace operations that include peace enforcement, peace-maintenance, and peace building. Of course, to implement this peace operations model will have a heavy cost in resources. The international community will need to weigh what costs the most—applying the resources now to fix Somalia or wait until Somalia becomes a terrorist sanctuary and then be forced into a war to turn the state around. The author argues that now is the time for the

international community to fix Somalia,   using resources for a sound peace operations model rather than wait to fighting a more costly war against terrorists in Somalia in the future.

EAST TIMOR

The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) ran from 11 June to 13 September 1999, and then transitioned from UNAMET to International Force East Timor (INTERFET) and remained in place from 13 September to 28 February 2000.

Problems in East Timor began in 1975 when the Portuguese government released East Timor from several centuries of colonial rule. Portugal established a provisional government to help East Timor make the transition from colonial rule. But friction developed between the East Timorese who wanted independence and those who wanted to become part of Indonesia. Shortly thereafter, civil war erupted.

Portugal withdrew from East Timor when it realized it was unable to stop the war. The Indonesian government sent its military into East Timor to stop the fighting and to occupy the country. As soon as the military successfully stabilized country, Indonesia declared East Timor to be its 27th province. The U.N. rejected the Indonesian declaration, and the Security Council called for Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor, but Indonesia continued to occupy East Timor. In 1982, seven years after the start of the occupation, U.N. started holding talks with Indonesia on a regular basis to resolve the status of East Timor.[52]

Indonesian rule of East Timor was brutal. The East Timorese resisted the Indonesian occupation through the insurgency and student resistance movements. The Indonesian government developed a network of spies and informants to crush these movements. Close to 200,000 people died from the Indonesia attempts to defeat the resistance movement.[53] Under Indonesian domination, the media was censored, the military controlled many of the businesses, and the professional and civil service positions were mostly filled by non-Timorese.

In 1998, Ambassador Jamsheed Marker, U.N. Personal Representative to East Timor, met with B.J. Habibie, the new Indonesian President to discuss the East Timor autonomy. In May 1999 an agreement signed by Indonesia and Portugal entrusted the U.N. to determine whether or not the East Timorese people would accept special autonomy within the unity of Indonesia. The Security Council passed U.N.S.C.Resolution 1246 in June 1999, establishing the United Nations Mission in East Timor. Some of the key points highlighted in that U.N. Resolution focused on

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- Organizing and conducting a popular consultation, scheduled for August 1999, by which the East Timorese people would vote to accept or reject the proposed special autonomy. East Timorese rejection of the proposed special autonomy, would lead to the separation from Indonesia.
- Deploying 275 civilian police to serve as advisors to Indonesian police and 50 unarmed military liaisons officers to maintain contact with the Indonesian military.
- Ensuring that the consultation is carried out without intimidation, violence, or inference (Responsibility of the Indonesian government).
- Maintaining a peace and security in East Timor (Responsibility of the Indonesian government).[54]

In August 1999, UNAMET registered 431, 798 people to vote. With 98 per cent of the people voting, 78.5 per cent of the East Timorese people voted for independence from Indonesia. Right after the election announcement on 4 September 1999, the pro-integration militias began killing civilians and looting and burning homes and villages. To Avoid the murderous attacks people fled to the hills and jungles in East Timor or escaped to West Timor. Over 500,000 people were in need of humanitarian assistance. Lack of security and possible attacks by militia prevented the NGOs from reaching people to provide food and medical assistance.[55]

President Habibie of Indonesia tried to convince the U.N. that the Indonesian military had everything under control. But as the violence and the killing continued, Australia and other nearby countries began pressuring the U.N. to send in an intervention force. Australia offered to head up the intervention force. But without having consent from President Habibie, the U.N. Security Council would not send in an intervention force. Then members of the U.N. Security Council visited East Timor and were appalled by the degree of destruction there. They became convinced that the Indonesian military was supporting militia efforts internal to East Timor. That visit and the continued pressure from U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and the international community induced President Habibie to give consent in September 1999 for intervention by an international force.[56]

On 15 September 1999, the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1264. The Security Council authorized a multinational force led by the Australians to—

- Restore peace and security in East Timor
- Protect and Support UNAMET in carrying out its mission
- Facilitate humanitarian assistance

- Use all necessary measures to carry out these tasks.[57]

The International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) for peace enforcement operations arrived in East Timor on 20 September 1999. INTERFET was a heavily armed force of 11, 500 all ready for combat. They were effective in restoring peace and security. With their presence the militia violence ended, refugees began returning from West Timor, and the U.N. and NGO relief workers were able to provide food and medical assistance.[58] INTERFET's mission was successful because the force was armed, equipped and manned to accomplish it.

In 19 October 1999, the Indonesian government formally agreed to accept the election results of the East Timorese people to become independent from Indonesia. With that decision, the U.N. assumed control over East Timor. The U.N. Security Council passed U.N. Resolution 1272 on 25 October 1999 to initiate the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The resolution authorized the U.N. to serve as administration during the process establishing a government and rebuilding the nation.[59] UNTAET officially took over from INTERFET on February 28, 2000.

The UNAMET force sent to oversee the registering of East Timorese to vote and to insure an election in which they could decide their future destiny was successful. Unfortunately, the violence and murderous attacks committed by the militia placed a black mark on its achievement. The militia was attacking and killing East Timorese prior to the UNAMET mission and the Indonesian military allowed it to occur. The U.N. reliance on Indonesians to provide security in East Timor was a mistake. According to William Maley in his 2000 *Australian Journal of International Affairs* article, "Australia and the East Timor Crisis: Some Critical Comments," the U.N. needed to bring in a peacekeeping force to overcome the problem of security in East Timor, because militia leaders at a rally in February 1999 had threatened war if East Timor moved toward independence.[60] Once the militia began killing the East Timorese and burning their homes and villages at a minimum the U.N. should have offered to send in a peace enforcement force able to provide security for the voting operations.

The U.N. Security Council, would not authorize an intervention force until the U.N. Secretary was able to obtain consent for the intervention from President Habibie. Only when the Security Council saw the crisis first hand were they convinced of the need for an international force in East Timor.

Consent from President Habibie to allow intervention forces into East Timor could have encouraged the U.N. to authorize Chapter VI peacekeeping operations in East Timor. But with the Indonesian armed forces and locally-organized militia executing East Timorese, a peacekeeping force following Sir Brain Urquhart's principles would have had difficulty carrying

out their mission, especially since the peacekeeping force would have been were entering an environment where the armed military and militia were out of control.

The U.N.'s decision to authorize Chapter VII peace enforcement operations instead, was the right employment decision for forces sent to East Timor. By authorizing peace enforcement operations, INTERFET had the authority to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate to restore peace and security. Furthermore, the authorization allowed the deployment of a force (11,500) capable of providing security and preventing further violence and terror in the region. And it opened the door for successful humanitarian relief operations.

Although not used in East Timor, peace maintenance operations could have helped the U.N. carry out its administrative role of establishing good governance. Peace maintenance operations focus on involving a failed state's citizens in the process of establishing good governance. Had the U.N. undertaken peace maintenance operations, it would have avoided the criticism it received for not having involved the East Timorese in the development of a good governance process.

Peace building operations have been successful in helping reestablish infrastructure and economic stability in East Timor. The special mix of personnel included in a peace building force is working the process to help East Timor to become a self-sustaining country instead of a failed state. The international community pledged economic help to rebuild East Timor. the work of UNATET is a good example of how the international community has been willing to pledge economic support to rebuild the country. "After the U.N. and the World Bank conducted a Joint Assessment Mission in late 1999, some two dozen international donors pledged at least $555 million for the first three years for reconstruction."[61] According to the World Bank, the recovery has been strong; agriculture production is up and the services sector is developing.[62]

The violence and murder committed by the Indonesian militia could have been avoided if the U.N. had sent in a peace enforcement force at the beginning of the UNAMET mission. The U.N. made the right decision to make the INTERFET a peace enforcement operation. That mission was deemed very successful because peace and security was restored,. Refugees began returning. Peace enforcement allowed the consultation process to continue. As a result, the Indonesian government formally agreed to accept the election results of the East Timorese and permit them to become independent from Indonesia. The success of INTERFET also paved the way for UNATET's mission of establishing good governance, developing the economy, and rebuilding social services.

CONCLUSION

U.N. intervention in the fate of failed states will continue in the future. Given the events of 11 September 2001, the spotlight is more than ever turned to the problem of failed states. Several terrorist groups currently have found homes in a number of these states. In forums held by the international community seeking consensus on ways to address the problem of failed states, members of the international community, particularly the U.S., have come to realize that fixing failed states requires more than just providing foreign aid. Fixing failed states may require several years of involvement and participation. Helping a failed state until it can sustain itself politically and economically may mean staying committed and engaged even under adversity. The international community must be willing to consider many approaches to help reduce problems in failed states.

The U.S. and the international community, know that to be successful in restoring stability in a failed state, the U.N. must be able to work on the root causes of the problem or they risk having to do the job a second time. The peace operations model is the only model at this time able to control conditions in a failed state well enough to allow root causes to be ameliorated. is one that encompasses three carefully phased, manned, and equipped specific operations: peace enforcement, peace-maintenance, and peace building operations.

Peace operations in Somalia and East Timor have shown us that it is essential to intervene with the right kind of forces to conduct the mission. Conducting initial interventions in Somalia with a peacekeeping operation jeopardized the mission. The U.N.'s peacekeeping force was the wrong level of military force for employment in Somalia. Such a force is not manned nor equipped to face the lawless, combat-type environment inevitable in a failed state. The lightly-armed military was not able to protect themselves nor others when faced with a heavily-armed group of warlords. Having only a peacekeeping force at hand, the U.N. lacked firepower not only to defend against attacks from belligerents, but also to carry out the broader aspects of their security mission. The NGOs were unable to provide food and medical assistance and, as a result, the famine and refugee flow persisted--seriously threatening regional peace and stability. Furthermore, because the peacekeepers could not maintain peace and security in the lawless environment, the U.N. in Somalia was unable to implement plans for establishing good governance or peace building.

Obversely, when the U.N. first intervened in East Timor, the UN's mandate was limited to performing peace operations In East Timor--but that changed with the militia's continued destruction of the country. When the U.N. saw their peacekeeping force was inadequately

prepared to address the conditions as they were found, the Security Council quickly revised their plans. The second U.N. military force was ready to face combat-type conditions. Conducting initial interventions as peace enforcement operations with a heavily armed force fosters success in addressing the characteristic war-like environment.[63]

Moving from a peacekeeping force to a peace enforcement force in East Timor ensured intervention by a military force ready to face combat-type conditions. When law and order was restored and peace was enforced, conditions for peace building and good governance were established. The U.N. and the NGOs were able to establish political authority and to begin rebuilding the nation. The follow-on UNATET mission was then able to help establish good governance and assist in the development of civil social services. All this was made possible by the U.N.'s decision to send in peace-enforcement forces manned and equipped to establish law and order out of the chaos of a failed state.

The challenges in failed states will mandate the 21st Century use of a peace operations model that includes peace enforcement, peace maintenance, and peace building. Peace operations in failed states can only be successfully carried out using a multilateral approach. Involvement of U.S. and the entire international community is crucial. Each leg in the model requires manpower and money. For one nation to shoulder the cost this model of peace operations without support from the international community would significantly drain that nation's resources. Each nation can determine what stage(s) of the peace operations to support with resources.

According to current indicators, failed states will continue to pose serious security challenges for the international community. The international community needs to plan now to intervene early. And the international community, when it intervenes, should use a peace operations model that includes peace enforcement, peace maintenance and peace building.

WORD COUNT = 8,435

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